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I. INTRODUCTION
The "law and literature" movement to date consists of two rather dif-
ferent enterprises and concerns. The older, more familiar variety, "law
in literature," consists of examining literary works such as Shakespeare's
Merchant of Venice, Melville's Billy Budd, or Kafka's The Trial for their
insight into and assessment of legal issues and problems.1 The second-
the driving force in the recent law and literature movement-emphasizes
interpretation of literary and legal texts. Interpretation, of course, has
always been central to literary and humanistic endeavors, but has taken
on growing importance for law as belief in literature as a unique variety
of text has eroded. The tendency to speak about legal and literary texts
in the same breath thus seems more appropriate than it might have in
earlier decades and largely stems from changes in modes of literary criti-
cism. Interest is now focused on the extent to which the same or similar
interpretive modes and strategies can or should be employed in a variety
of different discourses.2
Alexander Welsh's Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstan-
tial Evidence in England does not fit easily into either category. It may
1. See Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988). Such
studies may be undertaken for their own sake, or as Richard Weisberg has recently suggested, for
what lawyers can learn about ethical aspects of law. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS AND
OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992).
2. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THE CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES (1980); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975); RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988); An Interpretive
Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 739 (1982); Sanford Levinson, Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982); Paul Brest,
Interpetation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982). The development of the law and literature
movement also owes much to the large number of American legal scholars who have done advanced
work in literary and related areas prior to entering the legal profession.
1
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be thought of as having extended the boundaries of the second, more
recent development of law and literature studies. Perhaps Welsh, a dis-
tinguished literary scholar, has even developed a third variety, one that
seeks to link legal modes of thought of particular historical eras with
non-legal cultural experience of the same era. Welsh attempts to demon-
strate a close relationship between eighteenth- and early nineteenth-cen-
tury concepts of circumstantial evidence in English criminal law and the
development of the English novel during that period. If that were all he
attempts one might wish simply to state his thesis, suggest the extent to
which he is able to support it, and be done with it. But he has done a
good deal more-he has begun to explore the relatively unknown area of
the history of the Anglo-American law of evidence, and has attempted to
show how both literary and legal concepts of evidence were linked to the
wider world, in the areas of religion and natural science. If he has not
been altogether successful, he has made a significant foray into an impor-
tant, though little explored, area of law and culture.
My essay has two parts. The first describes Welsh's argument and sug-
gests the extent to which it might be accepted or emended. In order to
establish the connection between the concepts of circumstantial evidence
in law and the "strong representation" he finds so characteristic of late
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels, Welsh not only examines sev-
eral features of the English criminal trial but also looks to such impor-
tant legal thinkers as Jeremy Bentham and James Fitzjames Stephen. He
also attempts to link these materials to circumstantial modes of thinking
present in eighteenth-century natural theology and nineteenth-century
geology and paleontology. Although Henry Fielding's The History of
Tom Jones and Sir Walter Scott's Waverley Novels provide the primary
foundation for the importance of circumstantial evidence and for the
prosecutorial manner in which it was handled by narrators, Welsh also
explores the way in which several leading drama critics utilized circum-
stantial evidence to create their own narratives. The concluding portion
of the book traces the erosion of "strong representation" in the novel in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With this development,
Welsh implies, the close linkage between law and literature comes to an
end.
My aim in the second part of this essay is to develop the relationships
among the concepts of circumstantial evidence as they appear in a
number of different areas of life. To achieve this, I explore the relation-
ships Welsh discusses in the context of a more extended time frame than
the one he examines. I begin with a brief characterization of classical
rhetoric's formulation and use of "circumstances," and attempt to show
how rhetorical devices found their way into the Romano-canon and com-
mon law systems at both the pretrial and trial phases of criminal law
proceedings. This analysis is followed by some suggestions about the
[Vol. 5: 219
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uses of direct and circumstantial evidence in connection with seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century natural and revealed religion, as well as a
brief treament of the role of circumstantial evidence in the casuistical
tradition, and the literary techniques that evolved from it. I discuss the
interrelated role of "facts," "inferences from facts," and narrative issues
in connection with historiography, a topic largely omitted by Welsh. I
then make some suggestions concerning the role of circumstantial evi-
dence and facts in early modern natural philosophy and science. I con-
clude with some reflections on the relationship between "facts,"
"circumstantial evidence," and "probability" in law, history, early mod-
ern natural philosophy, and the rhetorical tradition.
II. THE ARGUMENT OF ALEXANDER WELSH'S STRONG
REPRESENTATIONS
Focusing on the period spanning the late eighteenth century to the end
of the nineteenth century in England, Welsh argues that "narrative con-
sisting of carefully managed circumstantial evidence, highly conclusive in
itself and often scornful of direct testimony, flourished nearly every-
where-not only in literature but in criminal jurisprudence, natural sci-
ence, natural religion, and history writing itself."3  Beginning with the
Enlightenment, novelists from Henry Fielding to Henry James typically
"chose narratives built on carefully managed circumstantial evidence."4
This mode of "strong representation"-making facts speak for them-
selves-became the most prominent narrative form.5 These narratives
do not simply set forth a quantity of circumstantial evidence calculated
to prove a certain case. They also suggest that firsthand testimony is
untrustworthy unless corroborated by circumstances. They "subordinate
facts to a conclusion" and make claims to "know" without anyone hav-
ing observed what is known. For over a hundred years "strong represen-
tations" "outmanned and outmaneuvered" narratives actually or
purportedly based on firsthand knowledge.6
For Welsh, "strong representation" in literature needs to be put into a
historical context. Welsh suggests that the preference for circumstantial
evidence first appeared in natural theology. He notes that the rational
proofs for the existence of God and the promise of a future life, which
had been commonplaces since the late seventeenth century, relied on cir-
cumstantial evidence. He places particular emphasis on the role of
Bishop Butler, who in 1736 provided one of the earliest uses of the term
"circumstantial evidence." Butler insisted that circumstantial evidence
3. ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS: NARRATIVE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND ix (1992).
4. Id. at 17.
5. Id. at ix, x.
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was "very often altogether as convincing, as [t]hat, which is the most
express and direct." 7 While the circumstantial nature of the proofs of
natural religion, which required arguing from effects to causes, is undeni-
able, one must also note that theologians of the same era invoked the
testimonials of multiple and credible witnesses to prove the truth of
revealed religion and its miracles. Acceptance of circumstantial evidence
in religion was thus not accompanied by the suspicion of direct testimony
that Welsh found characteristic of eighteenth-century literary narrative
and criminal trials.
The most innovative portion of Welsh's initial chapter, then, focuses
on the criminal trial and its influence on literary form. Facts represented
in jury trials are necessarily absent and unseen, and there is need to make
them present and consequential for the jury. Welsh points to an unusual
feature of mid to late eighteenth-century English criminal trials-the
inclination to prefer circumstantial evidence to direct testimony. Welsh
is undoubtedly correct in emphasizing this preference for circumstantial
over direct evidence, a clear reversal of previous legal practice. He is also
able to show some continuities between earlier and later practice. For
instance, Welsh is aware that earlier English courts, whatever their evi-
dentiary preference, often convicted on the basis of circumstantial evi-
dence. He notes that the legal concept of presumption-inferences
drawn from circumstantial evidence-was in use long before the eight-
eenth century. He points out the civil law origins of Sir Edward Coke's
categorization of presumptions and the Aristotelian argument that
"probabilities are never convicted of perjury."' But, given the scarcity of
historical research on the the law of evidence,9 it is not surprising that
Welsh views English attitudes toward circumstantial evidence in too
insular a context, neglects the use of circumstantial evidence in pretrial
procedure, and mistakenly views the role of circumstantial evidence in
poisoning cases to be a novelty. O
Welsh points out that mid eighteenth-century jurors began to hear
advice on the superiority of circumstantial evidence from prosecutors
and judges before discussions of circumstantial evidence entered the trea-
tise tradition. He draws particular attention to Francis Buller's charge to
the jury in R v. Donellan, which included a statement that
7. Id. at 13 (quoting JOSEPH BUTLER, THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION 399 (1736)).
8. Id. at 16, n.25.
9. But see BARBARA SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991) [hereinafter
SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT]; BARBARA SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RELIGION,
NATURAL SCIENCE, HISTORY, LAW AND LITERATURE (1983) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY
AND CERTAINTY]; Alessandro Giuliani, The Influence of Rhetoric on the Law of Evidence and
Pleading, 62 JURID. REV. 216 (1969); Theodore Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of
Reasonable Doubt, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 299 (1959).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 40-45.
[Vol. 5: 219
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a presumption, which necessarily arises from circumstances, is often
more convincing and more satisfactory than any other kind of evi-
dence, because it is not within the reach and compass of human
abilities to invent a train of circumstances which shall be so con-
nected together as to amount to a proof of guilt. . . . But if the
circumstances are such, as when laid together bring conviction to
your minds, it is then fully equal, if not. . . more convincing than
positive evidence. I
Baron Legge's charge to the jury in R v. Blandy similarly emphasized
that presumptions arising from circumstances were "more convincing
and satisfactory" than any other kind of evidence because "facts cannot
lie."12 Maxims such as "facts cannot lie," or "circumstances cannot lie,"
were reiterated in the courts and in the popular work of William Paley. 13
While Welsh cannot fully explain the growing, if temporary, prefer-
ence for circumstantial evidence, he offers interesting insights.14 Welsh
notes that circumstantial evidence becomes an important prosecutorial
tool in the late eighteenth century as lawyers begin to play a more central
role in criminal proceedings. Welsh's focus on the prosecutorial uses of
circumstantial evidence leads to a perceptive discussion of Edmund
Burke's prosecutorial role and language in the impeachment of Warren
Hastings, and an effort to link his performance with the language and
doctrine of R v. Donellan.15 These considerations in turn are linked to
Bentham's critique of the English rules of evidence, which is viewed as
having much in common with Burke.16
Having established the legal context, Welsh moves on to his central
thesis that the newly important legal concept of circumstantial evidence
was of critical importance in the transformation of the English novel. In
particular, he stresses the repudiation of the earlier novel's false frame of
letters and other documentation, and its reports of firsthand witnesses in
favor of narration constructed from circumstantial facts. The earliest
novels had been presented as either a series of letters as in Samuel Rich-
ardson's Pamela, or as a personal journal or other first-person account as
11. WELSH, supra note 3, at 28 (quoting JOSEPH GURNEY, TRIAL OF JOHN DONELLAN 52
(1772)).
12. Id. at 29.
13. For Paley, see id. at 16 n.16. See also SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note
9, at 220-21.
14. For one such insight, Welsh's reference to the Aristotelian maxim that "probabilities are
never convicted of peijury," see supra text accompanying n.8. The existence of this Aristotelian
notion points to the classical, European-based origins of the trends stressed by Welsh as being
uniquely English.
15. WELSH, supra note 3, at 33. Burke's insistence that circumstances be considered as a whole,
not singly and in part, echoes Sir Matthew Hale, who noted: "That imperfect evidence at Law which
taken singly or apart makes but an imperfect proof, semiplena probatio, yet in conjection with others
grows to a full proof, like Silurus, his twigs, that were easily broken apart, but in conjection or union
were not to be broken." SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION OF MANKIND 130
(1677).
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in Daniel Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year. The innovation of Fielding
and his successors is characterized by the abandonment of these forms in
favor of a narrative that purported to present facts from which the narra-
tor and reader could build up knowledge of the characters' actions and
motivations. The reality of these novels is "expressed by their internal
connectedness of circumstances." The History of Tom Jones thus
becomes the paradigmatic novel for Welsh, as he analogizes Fielding's
stories of the characters' lives to the criminal trial. In both the novel and
the criminal trial, themes of innocence and guilt are central. Welsh
emphasizes the prosecutorial bent of the novel and highlights the role of
the narrator in fixing intention and bringing conviction through the mar-
shalling of evidence. 7 Fielding first presents the various representations
of facts marshalled against his protagonist, Tom Jones, and then provides
a fuller representation of those facts which exonerates him. Welsh notes
the evidence in the novel that holds up is nearly all indirect, and that the
evidence that misleads is mostly direct. The narrator manages the evi-
dence in large part by discrediting witnesses.I 8
Although Welsh acknowledges his indebtedness to Ian Watt's and
William Empson's suggestions about the similarity of the role of novel
reader and juror, and notes the consistency of his own approach with
reader-oriented modes of literary criticism, he hopes to extend these
approaches to "uncover the evidentiary basis of Fielding's realism."19
For Welsh, as well as Watt, Tom Jones represents a major shift in the
novel as Fielding diverts attention "from the content of the report to the
skill of the reporter" who now presents the reader with a "sifted and
clarified report of the findings."2 ° In Fielding's novel the narrator
presents, summarizes, and evaluates evidence. Thus the narrator is not,
for Welsh, comparable to a witness but rather to a prosecutor, judge, or,
later, defense counsel.2
These insights, building on the work of previous critics, are the most
interesting and innovative parts of the book. Even here, however, it may
be advisable to query Welsh's prosecutorial emphasis. Fielding, after all,
entitled his novel The History of Tom Jones, and insisted that he was a
historian.22 Historians were experienced at marshalling both direct and
17. Id. at 47. Welsh notes the paradox of Fielding's prosecutorial role as a London magistrate
and his management of the defense of his major character, Tom Jones.
18. Id. at 48, 57-58, 60-62.
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. at 63 (quoting IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL: STUDIES IN DEFOE, RICHARDSON,
AND FIELDING 29-30 (1957)).
21. Id. This line of argument is continued in the analysis of Sir Walter Scott's Waverly Novels.
In Waverly, the arrested innocent hero's intentions and actions are judged by several characters.
One construes the circumstantial evidence against Waverly as a coherent story of guilt while others
exploit its potential for his defense. Waverly is thus characterized as "another carefully managed
narrative analogous to a trial." Id. at 83, 86-88.
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indirect evidence in the process of creating their narratives of "strong
representation." Why invoke the prosecutorial model if the model of the
historian provides a better, or at least equally good fit and is suggested by
the author himself?
Welsh's third chapter is concerned with eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Shakespearean character analysis and it is less satisfying than the
earlier chapters, in part because Welsh has some difficulty linking his
insights into criticism to his discussion of the novel. Although Welsh
suggests that drama should be included in his treatment of law and litera-
ture, particularly because circumstantial evidence plays an important
role in plays such as Othello, he does not develop this line of thought
because he believes Shakespeare lived before the "heyday of circumstan-
tial evidence."23  Welsh's concern with drama, therefore, centers on a
mode of Shakespearean criticism rather than drama itself. It is this mode
of criticism which Welsh attempts to link to both the narrative tradition
of the realistic novel of "strong representation" and the modern criminal
trial.24 He suggests that both Maurice Morgann's late eighteenth-cen-
tury defense of Falstaff and A.C. Bradley's 1904 defense of Hamlet
employ a forensic mode to defend and analyze dramatic characters. By
both discrediting the testimony of witnesses and drawing inferences from
other evidence, Morgann vindicates Falstaff of the charge of coward-
ice.2  Welsh suggests not only that the entire process leads to an
exchange of drama for narration, but also that the attempt to modify our
assessment of Falstaff is modeled on the jury trial. Without the popular-
ity of criminal trials in print, he insists, it would be difficult to explain
Morgann's enthusiasm for circumstantial evidence.2"
While the popular trial narrative genre may have influenced Morgann,
there are alternative explanations. Classical rhetoric, an important ele-
ment in English education, divided orations into three types, which
might be employed for a variety of purposes. Of significance here is the
"forensic" or "judicial" mode.27 The forensic model had often been
employed for non-legal topics long before the eighteenth century. Sir
Philip Sidney's The Defense of Poesy suggests how easily the forensic
model might be used within a literary context. Long and widespread
familiarity among literary men with the classical rhetorical tradition sug-
gests that the emergence of printed trial narratives could hardly have
provided a sudden and entirely novel impulse for a forensic style of dra-
matic criticism.
23. WELSH, supra note 3, at 103. As we shall later see, knowledge of and interest in
circumstantial evidence was actually quite extensive in the late sixteenth century, and was employed
during that era in both legal and literary contexts.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 111-13.
26. Id. at 119.
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The critique and judgment of moral character and action as an aspect
of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literary criticism also may be
explained by reference to casuistry. The tradition of casuistry, always
concerned with judgments of moral behavior, was transformed during
the eighteenth century. Casuistry's "cases of conscience" were first
transmuted into the fictional story in the form of moral essays that
abounded in the eighteenth-century literary periodical, and then trans-
formed again into the eighteenth-century novel.2" It is thus unnecessary
to refer to the courts to account for the kind of moral analysis provided
by Morgann. Literature itself had adopted such moral concerns directly
from religion.
Widespread interest in physiognomy, reading character from physical
attributes and actions, was also part of Morgann's intellectual milieu and
may have played some role in Morgann's defense of Falstaff. In 1743,
Fielding, Welsh's paradigmatic novelist of "strong representation," him-
self discussed the extent to which strength and weakness of character
might be judged from physical signs. Like his fellow novelist Tobias
Smollett, Fielding was deeply interested in the process of judgment by
which one can come to understand character, but he thought of that pro-
cess as an integral part of the human endeavor rather than as peculiar to
judge and jury.2 9
Like Morgann's defense of Falstaff, A.C. Bradley's highly influential
defense of Hamlet's dilatoriness was developed by looking behind the
words and events actually depicted on stage to the whole set of circum-
stances surrounding the necessarily fragmenting stage episodes. Ham-
let's character is reassessed on the basis of what can be inferred from
those circumstances, rather than simply from what the audience can see
and hear. Bradley's psychological explanation is thus characterized by
Welsh as being insistently circumstantial. And so it is. But is it necessar-
ily exclusively, or even primarily, based upon the model of the criminal
trial? Belief in the superiority of circumstantial evidence in trials already
had faded by the time Bradley wrote in 1904. Welsh himself observes
that Freud, roughly a contemporary of Bradley, also looked for signs,
symptoms, and traumatic experiences with which to make explanations.
If both developed explanations on the basis of "things unseen," it seems
28. See GEORGE STARR, DEFOE AND CASUISTRY (1971).
29. DOUGLAS PATEY, PROBABILITY AND LITERARY FORM: PHILOSOPHIC THEORY AND
LITERARY PRACTICE IN THE AUGUSTAN AGE 200-09 (1984). Rules based on signs developed for
judging character, like circumstantial evidence in the courts and elsewhere, were always considered
fallible and probabilistic, not conclusive. While circumstantial evidence might result in the "strong
representation" Welsh associates it with, it need not do so, and might on some occasions be
considered little more than "conjecture." Id.
Patey, who has investigated some of the ways that "signs" shaped literature in the eighteenth
century, notes a significant shift in how such signs were interpreted in the 1760s. He suggests that
the increased influence of the common sense philosophers meant that calculations of probabilities
became increasingly more likely to characterize villains than the sentimental hero. Id. at 221-22.
[Vol. 5: 219
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unwise to single out the criminal case built on circumstantial evidence as
Bradley's primary intellectual forerunner. For centuries, medical prac-
tice had been inferring causes from signs and symptoms. By the end of
the nineteenth century, inferences derived from the observable to the
non-observable were such a commonplace of the natural and social sci-
ences that it hardly seems possible that a sophisticated early twentieth-
century critic like Bradley could have been peculiarly influenced by court
practice. What thinking person of the early twentieth century would not
have looked to background events and overt behavior in assessing the
character of persons who spoke to him?
The next chapter is perhaps the least satisfying in the book. Welsh
presents a number of topics, including James Fitzjames Stephen's treat-
ment of circumstantial evidence, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century nat-
ural theology, nineteenth-century investigations of the extinction of
species, and Tennyson's In Memoriam.
Stephen was the outstanding evidence writer of the Victorian era.
Welsh focuses on Stephen's view that the law of evidence must employ
the same rational conception of proof in matters of fact as do other
fields.3" Welsh is certainly correct in this emphasis, although he over-
states Stephen's originality. In fact, the linkage between the law's search
for proof and that of other disciplines had become commonplace in phil-
osophical and legal writing by the early nineteenth century.
Having dealt with Stephen, Welsh turns to using "death" to connect
law and religion. He notes that both religion and law are greatly con-
cerned with death, a" although one might respond with Ben Franklin's
and Woody Allen's "Who isn't?" Welsh then argues that because natu-
ral religion failed "to deliver the promised circumstantial proof of a
future life," the law was particularly provoked to punish "at least those
who intentionally caused death." Of course the law of many societies
punished murder long before anyone had thought about natural religion
or circumstantial evidence, so it is difficult to know what to make of this
argument.32
One theme of this chapter is that in the nineteenth century, growing
disappointment with natural religion led to increased reliance on natural
history. Just as both natural religion and law had been concerned earlier
with circumstantial evidence, by the mid nineteenth century so too was
natural history. Thus, Welsh seeks to connect the treatment of circum-
30. WELSH, supra note 3, at 158.
31. Welsh suggests that "because of their specialized concerns with death, developments in the
fields of religion and the law were not only parallel but complementary." Id. at 165.
32. Both law and religion, Welsh suggests, were "alert to death"-reigion denies it and the law
"fixes the blame for it." He emphasizes the differences between death and murder as well, explaining
that the strong need to punish the latter was prompted by the failure of natural religion. According
to Welsh the failure of natural religion provoked the thought that "at least those who intentionally
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stantial evidence by the nineteenth-century evidence writer, Thomas
Starkie, with contemporary geology. Starkie uses the term "vestiges" in
analyzing circumstantial evidence and, of course, geology seeks the natu-
ral history of the earth in its current vestiges. But it is hard to know
whether this is much more than a verbal coincidence. What is clear,
however, is that Starkie's work tends to undercut, rather than reinforce,
Welsh's chronology of the law/literature connection. While Starkie does
note that crimes often leave vestiges by which offenders can be traced, he
also specifically rejects the superiority of circumstantial evidence, and
this rejection seriously undermines Welsh's thesis. As early as 1824,
Starkie rejected the maxim that "facts cannot lie," and insisted that both
direct and circumstantial evidence are capable of reaching proof beyond
reasonable doubt."3 For Starkie, circumstantial evidence could be used
to create both strong and weak representations. Moreover, Stephen
thought the term circumstantial evidence to be a misnomer because it
mistakenly led jurors to believe that they were being scientific when they
were only forming conjectures on the fact. And as Welsh himself points
out, the weakness of circumstantial evidence was stressed by defense
counsel precisely because belief in circumstantial evidence had eroded.
3 4
Thus the briefly-held dominant position of circumstantial evidence in law
at the end of the eighteenth century began to erode long before the late
nineteenth-century erosion of strong representation in literature, which is
the theme of Welsh's last chapter.
This portion of the book ambitiously extends Welsh's focus on law and
literature to religion and science.3 5 As we shall later see, he might also
have gone on to historiography. Indeed, one might argue that Welsh's
field of vision is insufficiently broad since it could include potentially all
fields of knowledge and experience that seek explanations and theories
drawn from "facts" which cannot be directly confronted. Although
Welsh moves cautiously in this direction, he cannot move very far with-
out weakening his thesis. An exploration of all disciplines and areas of
study which attempted "strong representations" in extended narrative
form would also have the effect of vitiating the specific linkages Welsh
has drawn between law and literature.
The difficulties with this portion of the book, then, are many. What is
seen as distinctive in Stephen, the late Victorian, is equally true for ear-
lier treatise writers. The connections drawn between religious and legal
33. 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 444,495, 514 (2d
ed. 1833). See also WELSH, supra note 3, at 496-97, 512.
34. WELSH, supra note 3, at 18.
35. As part of his natural history theme, Welsh shows us that nineteenth-century paleontology
began to construct narratives drawn from circumstantial evidence. He concludes the chapter with a
discussion of Tennyson's In Memoriam, a lengthy work mourning the death of his friend Arthur




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol5/iss1/15
Shapiro
concerns with death seem far-fetched as well. This chapter contains a
m6lange of interesting observations rather than a sustained argument
that links its component parts. Despite its difficulties, however, Welsh
continues to develop the interesting idea that the development of a con-
tinuous narration is linked to efforts to produce explanations and judg-
ments from circumstantial facts.
The lengthy concluding chapter traces the shift away from literary
narratives built on circumstantial evidence to a renewed interest in expe-
rience and subjectivity that could be captured only from testimony.36
The erosion of "strong representation" in literature, Welsh suggests, can
be seen as early as Tennyson's In Memoriam, since it already exhibits
greater interest in the poet's experience than its ostensible subject.37 The
erosion, charted in the poetry and novels of Robert Browning, Wilkie
Collins, and Henry James, is marked by a return to testimony as the
primary means of representation. Authors became less adjudicative, the
appropriate response was no longer a "pending verdict," and life was no
longer treated as a trial. Unlike the earlier form of the novel, however,
testimony is not merely reported, but investigated, and authors devise
multiple narratives, provide a larger role for the unconscious, and com-
bine direct testimony and managed indirect evidence.3" Art turns away
from its preoccupation with "strong representations" that fix blame or
exoneration, presumably ending its century-and-a-half connection with
the law.
The law/literature connection thus has limited chronological bounda-
ries for Welsh. It begins in the mid eighteenth century, as "strong repre-
sentation" borrowed from and relied on legal notions of circumstantial
evidence and its cognates in natural theology and geology, and fades
toward the end of the nineteenth century when "strong representation"
in the novel is superseded by different modes of representation.
III. AREAS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION
Despite the difficulties, Welsh has made a substantial contribution to
the law and literature movement. His contribution, however, needs to be
put into an even larger context and time frame because many of the
developments he investigates belong to a lengthy tradition in Western
thought and culture. The remainder of this essay is aimed at extending
our current understanding of the relationship betwen law and culture
and elaborating some of the themes suggested by Welsh.
36. WELSH, supra note 3, at 198-256.
37. Id. at 200.
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A. The Ancient World
Given Welsh's special interest in the concept of circumstantial evi-
dence, we should begin with the rhetorical tradition, for it is here that the
distinctions between artificial, or indirect proofs, and inartificial, or
direct proofs, were first drawn. Although not identical to the divisions
between circumstantial and testimonial evidence, these distinctions grad-
ually evolved into them. Articulated in their best known form by Aris-
totle, Cicero, and Quintilian, notions of artificial and inartificial proofs
were advanced in the context of oration rather than in connection with
the law of evidence, which was largely undeveloped in the ancient world.
Witnesses, deeds, reports, and precedents were inartificial proofs not cre-
ated by the orator, while artificial proofs constructed by the orator
included signs, arguments, and examples. In establishing the responsibil-
ity of an individual for a particular act, the orator might construct artifi-
cial proofs, or make arguments based on "persons," that is, family,
nationality, sex, age, education, and status. An individual's passions or
inclinations might be noted. Questions of time, place, and manner of an
event, and the capacity of an individual to have performed the act in
question, might be utilized by an orator, as could antecedents of the
affair, collateral circumstances, opportunity, instruments, and method.
Circumstances were the incidents of an event, the particularities that
accompanied an action. "Probable circumstances" could thus be
deployed to elicit positive or negative assessments of individuals and their
relation to an action under consideration.
39
B. The Romano-Canon Legal Tradition
Although the rhetorical tradition dealing with "circumstances" was
largely eclipsed during the early medieval era, it was revived and trans-
formed during the high middle ages. The orator's artificial proofs, some-
what modified, came to play an important role both in Romano-canon
pretrial procedure and in evidentiary concepts. Romano-canon lawyers
developed probabilistic concepts such as "suspicion" and "common
fame" to bring persons before appropriate tribunals. The ancient rhetori-
cal "signs" or "indicia" relating to family, education, habits, compan-
ions, social status, time, place, and the capacity to do the act were also
39. See CICERO, DE INVENTIONE I.xvii.24 (H.M. Hubbell trans., Loeb Classical Library 1949);
1 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTES OF THE ORATOR 1-4 (J. Patsaill trans., 1777). See also 4 QUINTILIAN,
supra.
Since Welsh attempts to link the legal concept of circumstantial evidence with natural philosophy
and religion, it is important to note that ancient natural philosophy was not characterized by
arguments from effects to causes or from "facts" to general principles. Physicians, however, unlike
natural philosophers, did examine "signs" to explain probable causes. Medical diagnosis, like the
circumstances of rhetoric, resulted in probable, not certain, knowledge. See IAN HACKING, THE
EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY,
INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE (1975).
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deployed to provide a uniform set of standards for the judicial decision to
employ torture.
Either confession or the testimony of two unimpeachable witnesses
was required for "full" or "legal" proof in serious criminal offenses. Cir-
cumstantial evidence was considered inferior and in most instances insuf-
ficient for conviction. The two witnesses or confession rule eventually
proved too stringent, and here again the classical rhetorical "circum-
stances" proved useful. By the thirteenth century, convictions based on
"undoubted indicia" resulting in "violent presumption" were permissible
at least in some instances. Thus conviction came to be based on those
same "signs," or circumstantial evidence, that provided the criteria for
torture. For instance, conviction on the basis of this admittedly inferior
evidence was also permitted in exceptional and unlikely-to-be-witnessed
crimes such as poisoning and witchcraft.4 The Romano-canon eviden-
tiary tradition, disseminated and elaborated in an erudite Latin treatise
tradition, was utilized in the ecclesiastical courts and increasingly in
most secular jurisdictions on the continent. Circumstantial evidence
played an important role in this development.
C. The English Legal Tradition
Some of the same rhetorical sources refined by the Romano-canonist
lawyers found their way into the English legal tradition, though the bor-
rowing has often been slighted and/or disguised. Evidentiary criteria
derived from classical rhetorical sources seems to have appeared first in
connection with arrest.4 ' Bracton's pronouncements on suspicion,
drawn in large part from Romano-canon sources, were cited in connec-
tion with arrest guidelines for several hundred years.42 Beginning in the
sixteenth century, handbooks provided lists of the "causes of suspicion"
to be used by justices of the peace in examining accused felons. These
causes of suspicion typically consisted of the age, sex, education, parent-
age, character, associations, and habitual behavior of the suspect, as well
as his ability to commit the crime, his whereabouts, the presence of wit-
nesses, and other "signs," such as blood. Several English pretrial proce-
dures, including arrest and interrogation, thus applied concepts of
circumstantial evidence prior to the period emphasized by Welsh.
The same was true of trial courts. During the sixteenth century, juries
40. In addition, "suspicion proof or the poena extraordinaria was developed so that less than full
proof permitted for less than full punishment," e.g., exile, monetary penalties, and the galleys. See
G.A. PALAZZOLA, PROVA, LEGALE E PENA: LA CRISI DEL SISTEMA TRA EVO MEDIO E MODERNO
(1978); JOHN LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE
ANCIEN REGIME (1977); Richard Fraher, The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of
the High Middle Ages:" Rei Publicae Interest, Ne Crimina Remaneant Impunita, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REV. 577.
41. See SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 9, at 127-30.
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gradually shifted their attention from personal knowledge to the evalua-
tion of evidence presented in court." Common law courts, like continen-
tal courts, also relied upon indirect or circumstantial evidence as well as
direct testimonial evidence, although they too were initially suspicious of
it. Late sixteenth-century treason trials, as Welsh notes, indicate that the
concept was well-known to judges and educated defendants, and that
convictions were often based on such evidence. Circumstances might
lead to light, probable, or violent presumption, although conviction was
appropriate only where violent presumption could be established.
The most famous example of violent presumption derived from "cir-
cumstances"-a man standing over a dead body, bloody sword in
hand-although frequently attributed to Coke, can be found earlier in
Bartolus and his many Romano-canon successors. Both Coke and Hale
were insistent, however, that presumptions derived from circumstantial
evidence must be used exceedingly carefully, because they might be erro-
neous." Their admittedly probabilistic character emphasized the pos-
sibilities of error. While circumstantial evidence might lead to the
"strong representation" emphasized by Welsh, it often led only to weak
ones, that is, to "light" or "probable" presumptions.
Long before the eighteenth century, the English also adopted the cate-
gory of the crimen exceptum, crimes unlikely to be witnessed, where cir-
cumstantial evidence was all that might be expected. Poisoning,
witchcraft, and later infanticide, rape, assassination, and forgery, were
crimes where circumstantial evidence was an appropriate basis for con-
viction. It is not surprising that Stephen's examples of circumstantial
evidence pointed out by Welsh involved poisoning, the most common
crime of this type.45
It is true, as Welsh notes, that the earliest English treatises on evidence
ignore circumstantial evidence. But circumstantial evidence quickly
appears with Capel Lofft's late eighteenth-century revision of Gilbert,
and Lofft and later treatise writers incorporate a good deal of the
43. For a discussion of the development of credibility, see Barbara Shapiro, To a Moral
Certainty: Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries, 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153
(1986). For the development of the jury, see THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO
CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800 (1985);
TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL JURY 1200-1800 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A.
Green eds., 1988).
44. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 9, at 214. Thomas Starkie took a
similar position. If circumstantial evidence sometimes offered "the most cogent arguments of guilt
... it is to be recollected that this is a species of evidence which requires the utmost degree of caution
and vigilance in its application." 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 558-59 (3d ed. 1842), quoted in WELSH, supra note 3, at 174.
45. The crime of witchcraft elicited a discussion of circumstantial evidence and the presumptions
drawn from them. There was disagreement as to whether these presumptions were appropriate for
arrest and examination only, or whether they might also be used for conviction. See SHAPIRO,
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 9, at 51-54, 209-12.
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Romano-canon tradition on presumption and circumstantial evidence."
Welsh is correct in emphasizing the positive assessment of circumstantial
evidence in the late eighteenth century, but he overestimates its novelty
given the long-term and familiar role of circumstantial evidence in arrest
and pretrial examination, its use in unlikely-to-be-witnessed crimes, and
the continuities between high medieval continental Romano-canon prac-
tices and sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English practices. Circum-
stantial evidence was firmly implanted in both continental and English
legal traditions a very long time before "strong representation" appears
in English literature.
D. Religion
Welsh has pointed to the importance of religion, particularly natural
theology, in reversing the low esteem for circumstantial evidence and in
bolstering its appeal in the context of law. The relationship of religious
thought to legal evidentiary practices is, however, more complex and
somewhat less favorable to circumstantial evidence than Welsh would
have us believe. For instance, the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard
of criminal law is directly related to the concept of the "moral certainty"
developed by the natural theologians.47 Yet the concepts of "moral cer-
tainty" and "beyond reasonable doubt" are distinctive precisely in
requiring proof far beyond the "mere probability" that circumstantial
evidence was initally thought likely to produce. Thus natural religion
contributed to the creation of a very high standard of proof in criminal
law, and, in this sense, created an obstacle to the acceptance of an
entirely circumstantial case as a legitimate basis for conviction.
Several additional features of the English theological scene bear on the
connections between law, religion, and literature. If circumstantial evi-
dence-the argument from effects to cause-was important to natural
theologians, many of the same theologians also utilized the concept of
credible testimony to support belief in miracles and the truths of Revela-
tion. Legalistic language of both testimonial and circumstantial evidence
pervaded theological literature. The choice of direct or indirect evidence
depended on the nature of the thing to be proved rather than a preference
for one kind of evidence over another.
In his treatment of the religion, law, and literature connection, Welsh
has neglected casuistry. This omission is unfortunate for two reasons.
First, casuistry is one of the religious traditions that is most strongly
related to the legal phenomena in which Welsh is interested. Second, it is
quite possible that at least part of the literary development that Welsh
46. For a discussion of Capel Lofft's and later treatise writers' indebtedness to the continental
legal tradition of circumstantial evidence and presumption, see id. at 220-43.
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seeks to link closely to law may be linked directly and just as closely to
religion through casuistry.
Although casuistry has a lengthy tradition, certain features of the Eng-
lish Protestant casuistical tradition merit special attention, given their
legalistic formulations, their probabilistic conclusions, and their empha-
sis on "cases of conscience." Perhaps the most important feature of cas-
uistry for our purposes is its use of legalistic formulations in reaching
judgment. Conscience, which provided internal testimony and judgment,
was likened to a judge who "holdeth an assize." The analogies of con-
science as a tribunal and judge were commonplace in England,4" and
Locke, too, viewed moral actions legalistically. Moral action, for Locke,
came under the jurisdictions of both outward and inward courts, that is,
of magistrate and conscience.49
Casuistry was that part of ethics in which particular circumstances
might alter judgment. The judgments of conscience, like those of the
criminal courts, were to take account of the circumstances that might
alter cases in reaching judgment. Indeed, the familiar "beyond reason-
able doubt" standard for conviction in criminal cases was initially formu-
lated as the "satisfied conscience" test. Legal judgment, like that of
conscience, involved making probabilistic judgments in situations where
some element of doubt was always possible. In both instances frivolous
doubts were to be rejected and only reasonable doubts allowed to influ-
ence judgment. The standard both for individuals reaching moral judg-
ments and jurors reaching decisions in criminal cases was that of the
"satisfied conscience."50 Given the parallels, it may often be difficult to
determine whether a literary concern for circumstances is derived from
some kind of rough analogy of the reader to a juror, or simply from the
treatment of the reader as an individual seeking to reach moral judgment
and thus inclined to adopt a well-known technique for doing so.
By the early eighteenth century, casuistry was being reshaped in two
rather different directions. Eighteenth-century moral philosophy, partic-
ularly that of the Scottish Common Sense school, owed a good deal to
casuistry.5' For our purposes, casuistry's link with its literary successors
is more important. George Starr's pioneering study traces the develop-
ment from casuistry's "cases of conscience," to the moral essays involv-
ing fictitious characters in early eighteenth-century literary periodicals,
and on to the novel, particularly the novels of Defoe.52 In all three forms
48. Id. at 4-17.
49. JOHN LOCKE, Two TRACTS ON GOVERNMENT 225 (Philip Abrams ed., 1967).
50. See SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY, supra note 9, at 74-118; SHAPIRO, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 9, at 13-41.
5 1. For a discussion of the Third Earl of Shaftsbury as the turning point from casuistry to a self-
conscious moral philosophy, see JEAN-CHRISTOPHE AGNEW, WORLDS APART 162-69 (1987).
52. See STARR, supra note 28, passim. Starr shows how the moral tales that pervade the
Athenian Mercury and other periodicals were often little more than elaborated cases of conscience.
These in turn are shown to have been expanded into novels by Defoe and other early novelists. For a
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particular circumstances are analyzed in order to reach judgments about
real and imagined individuals. And emphasis on moral judgment based
on circumstances, we should recall, is central to Welsh's thesis.53 Thus it
is possible that "strong representation" owes as much or more to religion
as to legal developments.
E. Historiography
It is perhaps ungrateful, given Welsh's efforts to investigate the con-
nections between so many areas of thought, to complain of omissions,
but one area, historiography, would seem to draw itself into considera-
tion, since it so insistently relies on both factual evidence and narration.
From its earliest beginnings, historiography has faced the problems of
providing both truth and satisfactory narration. At least from the Ren-
aissance to the nineteenth century, statesmen and others with close prox-
imity to the events in question were assumed to be the best historians.
The standard of the firsthand credible witness and the analogy of the law
court were frequently invoked by the historical community.
The position began to change as documents and "facts" were compiled
and subsequently analyzed by historians and antiquarians. Narrative rep-
resentations, explanations, and "conjectures" based on indirect evidence
such as buried urns, Stonehenge, and historical documents are evident
from at least the mid seventeenth century.54 We thus have a situation
more general discussion of casuistry, see ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988).
53. Starr did not develop the casuistical principle that "circumstances alter cases" into a
discussion of circumstantial evidence, no doubt because Defoe's narrative is so heavily dependent on
testimony. Defoe's narrative technique is thus viewed by Welsh as characterizing the phase of the
novel which precedes the novel's marshalling of circumstantial evidence.
54. John Nalson insisted that the historian was not merely to collect data, but "to tie up the
loose and scattered Papers, with the Circumstances, Causes, and Consequences of them." JOHN
NALSON, AN IMPARTIALL COLLECTION OF THE GREAT AFFAIRS OF STATE ii (1682). It should be
noted, however, that many students of historiography have emphasized the differences between the
antiquarian and the historian, viewing the former as having more in common with the natural
historian and the latter with the man of letters.
For discussions of early modem historiography, see JULIAN FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN AND THE
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY REVOLUTION IN THE METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND HISTORY (1961);
DENYS HAY, ANNALISTS AND HISTORIANS: WESTERN HISTORIOGRPAHY FROM THE VIIITH TO
THE XVIIITH CENTURY (1977); GEORGE HUPPERT, THE IDEA OF PERFECT HISTORY (1970);
DONALD KELLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP: LANGUAGE, LAW AND
HISTORY IN THE FRENCH RENAISSANCE (1971); George H. Nadel, Philosophy of History Before
Historicism, 3 HIST. & THEORY 291 (1964); Beatrice Reynolds, Shifting Currents in Historical
Criticism, 14 J. HIST. IDEAS 417 (1953).
For the development of English historiography, see F.J. LEVY, TUDOR HISTORICAL THOUGHT
(1967); D.R. WOOLF, THE IDEA OF HISTORY IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND (1990); F. SMITH
FUSSNER, THE HISTORICAL REVOLUTION: ENGLISH HISTORICAL WRITING AND THOUGHT, 1580-
1649 (1962); STAN MENDYK, "SPECULUM BRITTANNIAE": REGIONAL STUDY, ANTIQUARIANISM,
AND SCIENCE IN BRITIAN TO 1700 (1988); SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY, supra note 9;
Barbara Shapiro, History and Natural History in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England, An
Essay on the Relationship Between Humanism and Science, in ENGLISH SCIENTIFIC VIRTUOSI IN
THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES (1979); MARTINE BROWNLEY, CLARENDON AND
THE RHETORIC OF HISTORICAL FORM (1987); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND
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roughly comparable to that of the novelist who deals with circumstantial
evidence of his own creation-the need to create a continuous narrative
explanation based on facts that are viewed as existing separately from the
narrator. We have already noted in this connection that Fielding's Tom
Jones is called a "history" by its author, and that Fielding frequently
insists that he is a historian." It could perhaps be better argued that
Fielding's narrator has more in common with the historian, attempting
to make sense of both reliable and unreliable information and reports to
reach a more accurate and probable understanding, than with the prose-
cutor in a criminal trial. It would certainly be worthwhile to explore the
parallel shift from direct to indirect evidence in historiography and the
novel. Those interested in more recent historiographical developments
might see the breakdown of confidence in positivist historiography as
analogous to Welsh's treatment of the breakdown of "strong representa-
tion" in the novel.
F. Natural Philosophy
It is obviously impossible to discuss the history of natural philosophy
in detail; therefore, I note only a few points particularly relevant to
Welsh's arguments. Early modern physicians, like their ancient coun-
terparts, were accustomed to reasoning from effects to causes, that is,
from signs to causal explanations. Initially, however, their enterprise did
not count as natural philosophy, which continued to seek certain rather
than probable explanations. The seventeenth century, particularly in
England under the influence of Francis Bacon, introduced a greatly
enhanced role for natural "facts" within natural philosophy. 6 Bacon,
himself a lawyer and Lord Chancellor, spoke of interrogating nature,
perhaps on the model of a Chancery judge.
During the seventeenth century, naturalists attempting to purge the
facts of natural history of myth and fable often employed the legal lan-
guage of credible or multiple witnesses. The language of the law was
readily available to provide for the substantiation of the "facts" increas-
ingly central to natural philosophy. The language of credible witnesses
IDEAS 353 (1977); JOSEPH LEVINE, HUMANISM AND HISTORY: ORIGINS OF MODERN ENGLISH
HISTORIOGRAPHY (1987); JOSEPH LEVINE, DR. WOODWARD'S SHIELD: HISTORY, SCIENCE, AND
SATIRE IN AUGUSTAN ENGLAND (1977); THOMAS PEARDON, THE TRANSITION IN ENGLISH
HISTORICAL WRITING, 1760-1830 (1933); R.N. Strombert, History in the Eighteenth Century, 12 J.
HIST. IDEAS 395 (1951).
See also SEYMOUR CHATMAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE IN FICTION
AND FILM (1978); JAMES JOHNSON, THE FORMATION OF ENGLISH NEO-CLASSICAL THOUGHT
(1967); Leo Braudy, Hayden White, Rhetoric and History, in THEORIES OF HISTORY (1978).
55. BRAUDY, supra note 22, at 181. Braudy suggests interesting similarities between Hume's
approach to writing history and Fielding's concept of the novel. See also Phil Stevick, Fielding and
the Meaning of History, 79 PMLA 561 (1964); SHELDON SACKS, FICTION AND THE SHAPE OF
BELIEF (1964).
56. For a discussion of the creation of the natural "fact," see Lorraine Daston, Marvelous Facts
and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern Europe, 18 CRIT. INQUIRY 92 (1991).
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was thus not unusual among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century empiri-
cists, and was frequently invoked by empirically and experimentally ori-
ented Royal Society naturalists such as Robert Boyle." Locke's
epistemological explorations were couched in similar terms.58
The language and concept of circumstantial evidence was less fre-
quently exercised in natural philosophy, at least initially, though it was
necessary to invoke something like hypothesis, conjecture, or inference
from fact when advocating one or another form of the corpuscular
hypothesis. Such inferences from fact, always considered probable, were
not vastly different from "light, .... probable," or "violent" presumptions
drawn from circumstantial evidence. That Locke employed the con-
cepts of witness testimony, rather than conclusions that might be drawn
from "facts" or "signs," suggests that Welsh's observations on the prefer-
ence for testimonial evidence in the law court and novel before the mid
eighteenth century was paralleled in natural philosophy and epistemol-
ogy. Perhaps it was necessary to be confident that natural facts could be
"verified" before natural philosophers could feel confident about making
inferences, or "strong representations," from them. Isaac Watts's
Logick, written several decades after Locke, constructed probabilistic
arguments from facts in a way that Locke had not. 9
Some eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers used the term
"moral certainty," a term clearly associated with law, to indicate that
there were no infallible general principles of the physical world to be
derived from the facts of nature. Indeed, such parallelism of language is
not unusual in the legal literature. This is not surprising given that eight-
eenth- and nineteenth-century science, philosophy, and law were con-
sciously and explicitly involved in the question of how high a probability
of truth could be assigned to any particular inference from any particular
set of facts.
G. Literature
Given the limits of space, it will only be possible to allude to a few
literary developments not noted by Welsh that bear on his concerns with
circumstantial evidence and narrative method. At a minimum, we must
mention the revival of rhetoric that pervaded Renaissance literature and
57. 4 ROBERT BOYLE, THE WORKS OF ROBERT BOYLE 182 (1772); 5 ROBERT BOYLE, THE
WORKS OF ROBERT BOYLE 529 (1772). See also STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN
AND THE AIR PUMP: HOBBES, BOYLE, AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE (1985). For Robert Hooke's
use of the language of circumstances and conjecture, see ROBERT HOOKE, A DISCOURSE OF
EARTHQUAKES (1668), quoted in ENGLISH SCIENCE FROM BACON TO NEWTON 145-47 (Brian
Vickers ed., 1987). See also ISAAC NEWTON, A NEW THEORY ABOUT LIGHT AND COLOURS (1672),
quoted in id. "Circumstances" appears to be a cognate of "fact."
58. JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1690).
59. Watts argued that the discovery of human bones in a particular location might be used to
infer that the place was once a churchyard, or a battlefield, or that the bones might have arrived
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education, a revival that, of course, highlighted rhetorical conceptions of
circumstances. Erasmus's widely-read textbook On Copia of Words and
Ideas,6° known to generations of schoolboys, outlines the elements of the
"circumstances" that make up the "inartificial proofs" of the orator.
Thomas Wilson's rhetorical treatment of "circumstances," outlined in
his popular 1553 Art of Rhetorique, was almost immediately transferred
to the judicial handbooks to assist the justices of the peace in examining
accused felons. 6 ' Similar treatments appeared in the sixteenth-century
rhetorical works of Ralph Lever and Richard Sherry.62
Discussion of reasoning from effects to probable causes also appeared
in several Renaissance dialectical texts.63 It would have been difficult for
early modem writers to avoid contact with the rhetorical treatment of
"circumstances"; and rhetoric, we should recall, remained central in
English education well into the nineteenth century.
Although analysis of the continental novel typically begins with
Cervantes's Don Quixote, which emphasizes both its own fictionality and
authorial presence, the early English novel tended to disguise its fiction-
ality by means of such devices as letters and the testimony of witnesses.
However, literary concern with the distinction between fact and fiction,
as well as fact-likeness and verisimilitude, existed as early as the sixteenth
century both in England and on the continent. 6M Later decades put
increasing emphasis on truth, particularly the truth of "facts." The sev-
enteenth century was characterized by a growing literary taste for a less
rhetorical and more truth-oriented history, factual travel and political
reports, accounts of international news, and natural history purged of
60. ERASMUS, ON COPIA OF WORDS AND IDEAS 66-67 (Donald King & H. David Rix trans.,
1963).
61. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 9, at 154. See also id. at 148-64.
62. PATEY, supra note 29, at 38-41. Sherry, who discussed both fallible and infallible signs,
noted that blood on clothing might have resulted from a bloody nose. Id. at 39.
63. Such discussion appears both in Melanchthon's Erotometa Dialectica and Thomas
Bludeville's Art of Logicke. Id. at 39-40, 51.
64. See WILLIAM NELSON, FACT OR FICTION: THE DILEMMA OF THE RENAISSANCE
STORYTELLER (1973). For the early history of the novel, see WATT, supra note 20; LENNARD J.
DAVIS, FACTUAL FICTIONS: THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH NOVEL (1983); MICHAEL McKEON,
THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH NOVEL 1600-1740 (1987). McKeon, who emphasizes the role of
individual life histories, traces the development from saints' lives through spiritual biographies and
the picaresque and criminal biographies of real and fictitious persons. He emphasizes the importance
of detailed lives. It would seem appropriate to investigate the ways in which rhetorical
"circumstances" shaped drama. Shakespeare's Othello clearly shows how circumstantial evidence
could be used by one character to deceive another, as well as to determine truth. Also "things,"
"facts," and the "circumstances" of time, place, and manner as well as those associated with
individuals, e.g., social status, education, parentage, companions, etc., observed by theater audiences
must have been used by them to reach assessments of characters and events, much in the way that a
justice of the peace arrived at preliminary assessments of innocence and guilt, or the way that jurors
reached judgments about witness testimony and circumstantial evidence. The kinds of moral
judgments provided by Welsh's narrator of circumstantial evidence thus were probably internalized
by theater audiences two centuries earlier. Their assessments, of course, did not take narrative, or
even verbal, form.
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mythical creatures. Without the heightened belief in the value of "facts,"
a fiction based on fictional "facts" would not have been persuasive.
The role of fact-likeness in early fiction has, of course, been frequently
noted. Lennard Davis, like Welsh, emphasizes the English fascination
with real and fictional reports of criminality, rogues, and low-life, but
does not extend his analysis to the criminal trial. In addition, Davis has
shown what the early novel shared with other varieties of prose news.65
Douglas Patey, who has traced the many ways in which the concepts of
"probability," derived from rhetorical sources, were applied to a variety
of Augustan literary genres, also touches on issues that bear on Welsh's
themes. Among these are the theory and practice of verisimilitude in the
novel and other genres. Patey's treatment of "signs" and "probable cir-
cumstances" sheds light on the Augustan literary tradition, albeit with-
out Welsh's emphasis on the criminal trial. He notes the importance of
philosophers Thomas Reid and James Beattie, who specifically relate
"signs" to literary probability and decorum. Literary probability was to
be "consistent with itself, and connected with probable circumstances,"
that is, the "outward circumstances of fortune, rank, employment, sex,
age, and nation" and the "internal temperature of the understanding and
the passions .... ,,66 These traditions allowed early English novelists to
provide moral judgments as well as verisimilitude.
Patey also suggests that Reid's and Beattie's theory of signs led to a
theory of the structure of literary work. Probability in signs and circum-
stances guaranteed the unity and consistency of a literary work.6 7 For
Patey, eighteenth-century literature and literary theory were intimately
connected with the notion of "circumstances." And this more genera-
lized notion of "probable circumstances" needs to be placed alongside
Welsh's more specialized concern with the circumstantial evidence of the
criminal courts.
It must be emphasized, however, that early English novelists strove for
moral impact as much as for factual verisimilitude. As we have seen,
moral judgment so characteristic of early novels owed more than a little
to the moral stories that had developed from casuistry. Fictional facts,
whether provided by testimony or narrative based on circumstances and
circumstantial evidence, led to moral assessments of characters placed in
unusual or difficult situations or circumstances. Thus any complete
account of the evolution of factuality in the English novel must give full
weight to rhetoric and casuistry as well as law.
65. DAvis, supra note 64, at 42-102, 123-137. Davis, like Welsh, emphasizes the English
fascination with real and fictional reports of criminality.
66. Quoted in PATEY, supra note 29, at 87.
67. Id. at 88-89. For discussion of signs that point to internal mental qualities, and the influence
of physiognomy on art, see id. at 90ff. Patey also suggests that the theory of signs and circumstances
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IV. CONCLUSION
There are a number of conclusions that may be drawn from my discus-
sion of Welsh's work, and from my brief attempt both to extend and
further contextualize his innovative suggestions on the relationship
between the development of "strong representation" in the novel and
other areas of thought. The first is that current notions of "law and liter-
ature" are too limited and should be extended to incorporate the interac-
tion and intersection between law and other aspects of culture during a
particular period.
Welsh contributes in an important way to the increasing sensitivity to
the fact that neither law nor literature is an isolated phenomenon and
that both must be understood in much broader contexts than the ones in
which they have traditionally been treated. To put the matter differently,
the "literature" with which the law and literature movement concerns
itself ought to encompass a great deal more than fiction. My prelimi-
nary survey suggests that the areas of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
epistemology, logic, moral philosophy, historiography, and natural phi-
losophy have not yet been sufficiently integrated by legal, literary, or cul-
tural historians.
It also suggests that the long-recognized relationship between rhetoric
and law needs to be further explored. The rhetorical tradition has played
an important role not only in legal argumentation, relevance, and inter-
pretation, but in the law of evidence as well. This broad survey also
suggests that the rhetorical tradition, developed in the ancient world by
Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and others, was equally important to the
development of the English literary tradition. While the substantial
overlap between poetry and rhetoric has long been acknowledged by
Renaissance literary scholars, we are only beginning to recognize the
importance of rhetoric for the development of drama and the novel.68
One can, however, anticipate that the recent revival of scholarly interest
in rhetoric should soon yield rich rewards in studies of eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century literary culture.
Welsh's work also points to the importance of approaches to represent-
ing "reality" and the "verisimilar." This kind of work, currently being
carried on by specialists in literature and in the history of science, needs
68. See, e.g., JOEL ALTMAN, THE TUDOR PLAY OF MIND: RHETORICAL INQUIRY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ELIZABETHAN DRAMA (1978); MADELEINE DORAN, ENDEAVORS OF ART
(1954); WILLIAM KENNEDY, RHETORICAL NORMS IN RENAISSANCE LITERATURE (1978); WAYNE
BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION (1971); RICHARD LANHAM: THE MOTIVES OF ELOQUENCE:
LITERARY RHETORIC IN THE RENAISSANCE (1978); THE RHETORIC OF RENAISSANCE POETRY
(Thomas Sloan & Raymond Waddington eds., 1974); THOMAS SLOANE, DONNE, MILTON, AND THE
END OF HUMANIST RHETORIC (1985); BRIAN VICKERS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC IN ENGLISH
POETRY (1970); Hanna Gray, Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence, 24 J. HIST. IDEAS
497 (1963).
There has been far less interest in the role of rhetoric in eighteenth-century literature despite the
widespread recognition of the neoclassicism of the era.
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to come together in a fruitful way. A great many philosophical pieces of
the puzzle are still missing. In attempting to locate the missing pieces,
however, it is important to note that philosophy is most likely to come
into contact with law when both disciplines assume that a kind of practi-
cal, probabilistic knowledge is possible and desirable. Natural philoso-
phy and law are unlikely to overlap when philosophers adopt a rigorous
method of making claims to absolute certitude, or when they espouse
radical skepticism. The law, particularly the law of evidence, can deal
neither with too much certainty nor with too much doubt or skepticism,
for it is obvious that legal trials cannot achieve absolute certainty, yet
necessary that they come to some agreed conclusions.
Another missing element in our understanding of law and culture is a
more comprehensive knowledge of the interaction among all disciplines
purporting to deal with "facts." The facts of law, of natural philosophy,
and of history, and the invented facts of the fiction writer, require belief
in the capacity of human beings to attain adequate, if not perfect, knowl-
edge of those facts, and to make adequate, if not perfect, inferences from
those facts. Although the standards established may acknowledge the
possibility of error, they cannot include extreme doubt. It seems likely,
then, that the most "fact-oriented" eras are the ones in which we are
most likely to find close connections between the fact-oriented disciplines
such as law, history, and natural sciences, and fictional endeavors that
purport to establish facts and make appropriate inferences from them.
The lengthy period from the middle of the seventeenth century to the end
of the nineteenth century appears to be that period par excellence, and
Welsh gives us a major aspect of its linkage between fiction and non-
fiction.69 More study is required if we are to comprehend the relation-
ship between law and literature more generally. But this essay also sug-
gests that there are aspects of law, e.g., what constitutes appropriate legal
proof, that must be placed not only within a broader context but also a
longer time frame. A longer chronological examination than Welsh has
attempted may well reveal that changes in both English legal and
broader literary practices are as much the product of long-term origins
and developments, many of which are European-wide, as they are of spe-
cific, contemporaneous, English interactions.70
69. This is the period that most postmodern theorists and critics have labelled the "modern" era.
70. See, e.g., DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE
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